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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
Loren E. Pearce 
Appellant BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Vs. Appeal No. 20061077 
Oksana Zapassoff 
Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal properly lies with the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Sec.78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I : WHETHER TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
IN VIOLATION OF U.R.C.P. RULES 26(a)(4) AND 37(f) 
Standard of Review: "We review the district court's legal determination ... 
under a correctness standard, and thus accord it no deference." 
Bourgeous v. Department of Commerce, 1999 UT App 146,1(5, 981 P.2d 
414 (citing C.P. v. Utah Office of Crime Victims' Reparations, 966 P.2d 
1226, 1228 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). 
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Issue II: WHETHER THE COURT VIOLATED RULE 610 OF THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED CUMULATIVE ERROR BY ALLOWING 
t JNL-ui.l- Dl \n,Nl M MiDENIGRAll AMI) EMBARRASS APPELLANT 
WITH RESPECT TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. 
Standard of review: "We review a 
... for an abuse of discretion." State v. Fedorowicz, 2002 UT 67.1J24, 52 
P.3d 1194, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1123 (2003). "To properly exercise its 
discretion, a trial court must sen 
admitted." Id. 
Issue III: WHETHER THE COURT MADE CONTRADICTORY AND/OR 
IMI'UPPfc H ! ' ' ' ' I fcMLNi: " M ' \/' Rl" ' 'K l Jl " THE 
APPELLANT AND THAT CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR AND/OR 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
Standard of review: To establi.sli IIuj r/ibltjnu' nl "|il,nn e " .mil ulil.iin 
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, [A party] must 
show the following: "(i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been 
( ibsent the error, 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [party]." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Issue IV IN AWARDING SOI f" CUSTODY ) THE 
PETITIONER/APPELLEE, WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS 
2 
DISCRETION AND ERRED AS TO LAW IN DECLARING THE 
PETITIONER TO BE THE MORE COOPERATIVE PARENT. 
Standard of Review: In divorce proceedings, we disturb the action of the 
trial court only when the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
the trial court has abused its discretion or misapplied principles of law. 
Lord v. Shaw, Utah, 682 P.2d 853 (1984); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980). Subject to those limitations, we are free to review 
both the facts and the law. Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d 177, 
178 (1981); Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 1297 (1981). 
Issue V : WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF 
VIOLENT AND UNCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR ON PART OF OKSANA'S 
MOTHER AND ITS HARMFUL EFFECT ON THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD. 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue IV. 
Issue VI : WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING A DISTINCT 
POSSIBILITY THAT ABUSE MAY HAVE OCCURRED BY APPELLANT IN 
THE FACE OF THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
PREPONDERATES TO THEIR FALSITY. 
Standard of Review: Same as Issue IV 
Issue VII : WHETHER FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF ABUSE ARE GRAVE 
ENOUGH TO OPERATE AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILD AND REQUIRE A DIFFERENT AWARD OF CUSTODY. 
3 
Standard of Review : "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce 
matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
Issue VIII: WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE 
PREGNANCY OF APPELLANT'S WIFE AS A REASON FOR DENYING 
CUSTODY OF MARIA TO APPELLANT WHILE DISPARATELY FAILING 
TO CONSIDER CONCURRENT PREGNANCY OF APPELLEE. 
Standard of Review: In divorce proceedings, we disturb the action of the 
trial court only when the evidence clearly preponderates to the contrary or 
the trial court has abused its discretion or misapplied principles of law. 
Lord v. Shaw, Utah, 682 P.2d 853 (1984); Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 
P.2d 1218, 1222 (1980). Subject to those limitations, we are free to review 
both the facts and the law. Openshaw v. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d 177, 
178 (1981); Christensen v. Christensen, Utah, 628 P.2d 1297 (1981). 
Issue IX : WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT A RESPONSIBLE 
PARENT BASED ON WHAT THE COURT DEEMED TO BE CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT PAID HIS CHILD SUPPORT 
FROM A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE. 
Standard of Review: "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce 
matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). 
4 
Issue X: IN THE ALTERNATIVE , WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S 
AWARD OF SOLE CUSTODY TO THE APPELLEE AND THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF THE COURT'S ORDER COMPLY WITH THE 
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH AND OTHER 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND WHETHER ANY STATUTES OR COLOR 
OF LAW RELIED ON BY THE COURT ARE IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
COMPLIANCE. 
Standard of Review: "We employ heightened scrutiny under [Utah 
Constitution] article I, ... when reviewing legislation that "implicates" rights 
under article I, ...". Lee, 867 P.2d at 581. Wood v. University Medical 
Center where, "most, if not all, of [article I] rights have generated some 
form of heightened judicial scrutiny" and that "[notwithstanding the 
presumption of constitutionality we give to statutes, this court has 
consistently applied various forms of heightened review when article I 
rights are at issue." 2002 UT 134, fflj 37-46. 
"We review the trial court's ... judgment for correctness given the 
constitutional questions [Appellant] raises." Grand County v. Emery 
County, 2002 UT 57, fl 6, 52 P.3d 1148. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties, Loren Pearce, Respondent/Appellant and Oksana Zapassoff, 
Petitioner/Appellee, were married on July 28, 1997. A child issued from 
5 
the union, Maria Gloria Pearce, now age 7. Each party had custody of a 
child from previous marriages, Appellant's (hereinafter denoted as Loren) 
son, Ammon, age 15 and Appellee's (hereinafter denoted as Oksana) 
daughter, Alina, age 16. On February 15, 2003, the parties separated and 
obtained a bifurcated divorce on October 25, 2004. 
Custody of Maria and property division were adjudicated at trial on July 5th 
and 6th, 2006 with an Amended Decree of Divorce entered on October 13, 
2006. 
Loren appeals as to the award of Sole Physical and Legal Custody to the 
Appellee which he alleges, was in substantial part, unjustly influenced by 
false allegations of abuse and other parental unfitness. 
Loren argues that, during the course of the litigation associated with the 
judicial process of divorce, custody and property division, Oksana, 
implemented a premeditated strategy, in conspiracy with other biased 
witnesses, to discredit and demonize Loren with multiple counts of false 
allegations of abuse and dishonesty, with the intent of showing that he 
was/is an unfit parent, gain unfair advantage in Court and that he should 




WHETHER TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE IN 
VIOLATION OF U.R.C.P. RULES 26(a)(4) AND 37(f) 
Failure to Disclose Evidence Prior to Trial 
Appellant asserts that Appellee failed to disclose prior to trial the majority 
of her evidence offered at time of trial. Appellant did not receive the 
evidence prior to trial or a timely list of exhibits of all evidence offered and 
that such evidence offered was a surprise and in violation of Rule 26. 
Rule 26(a)(4)(C) states in relevant part, 
an appropriate identification of each document or other exhibit, 
including summaries of other evidence, separately identifying those 
which the party expects to offer and those which the party may offer 
if the need arises. Unless otherwise stipulated by the parties or 
ordered by the court, the disclosures required by subdivision (a)(4) 
shall be made at least 30 days before trial. 
Appellant asserts that Trial Court committed reversible error in allowing 
such untimely and incomplete evidence to be admitted. Furthermore, Trial 
Court violated Rule 37(f) that states, 
If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior 
response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall 
not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party 
shows good cause for the failure to disclose. 
In contrast, prior to trial and in compliance with Rule 26, Appellant provided 
to Appellee a copy of all exhibits and evidence he intended to use at trial. 
This put Appellant at a disadvantage in that Appellee was able to review 
7 
the Appellant's evidence and rehearse a response. In Glacier v. Klawe, 
2006 UT App 516 (Utah App. 12/29/2006), the Appellate Court noted that, 
"there is a strong policy underlying the modern rules of civil 
procedure that the 'instruments of discovery . . . together with 
pretrial procedures make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and 
more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the 
fullest practicable extent.' United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 
, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958); see also Roundy v. Staley, 1999 UT App 
229,1f11, 984 P.2d 404 (plurality opinion) ('[T]he purpose of Utah's 
discovery rules [is to] facilitate] fair trials with full disclosure of all 
relevant testimony and evidence.')." 
Harmless Error 
Appellant asserts that Appellee's failure to disclose her evidence prior to 
trial was not harmless error and that a reasonable trier of fact would have 
decided differently had Trial Court enforced Rule 26 . The evidence 
offered by Appellee goes to the substance of the case and not solely to 
impeach the credibility of the Appellant. Specifically, 
1. Appellee offered financial evidence dealing with the substantive issues 
of property division and financial obligations of the Appellant. The 
Appellant was prejudiced in not being able to review the information 
beforehand and to challenge calculations, estimates of values, etc. The 
Appellant stated that he disputed the information offered but needed 
time to review it and provide rebuttal (R. 206 : 7). Although the Court 
had already scheduled a third day for trial, that third day was denied by 
the Court as an opportunity to rebut the financial information. 
8 
2. A personal and confidential letter written by the Appellant to the 
Appellee in which the Appellant's religious beliefs were held up to 
ridicule (R. 13:11; 19:18; 21:5; 299:12). This goes to the substantive 
aspect of who is the more fit/responsible parent as well as the issue of 
credibility. This letter was not part of Oksana's list of exhibits. 
3. A Quit Claim Deed for a marital home in West Valley City in which the 
Appellant allegedly quit claimed his interest to the home to Appellee (R. 
321:9). This goes to the substantive issue of equity in the home and 
pre-marital assets. Not included in the list of exhibits. 
4. Hearsay comments from Loren's first wife, Tania Pearce, were read by 
Rhett Potter, Custody Evaluator, while on the witness stand (R.11:19) 
and were not on exhibit list. This goes to the issue of Appellant's 
fitness as a parent and previous allegations of abuse as mentioned in 
the Court's findings. 
5. A Notice of Lien against Appellant, not provided prior to trial, for alleged 
failure to pay child support and alleging an "astronomical" amount on 
which the court relied in its findings. (R. 178:23). 
6. A 19 year old divorce decree from Loren's first wife on which the Court 
relied in determining that Loren was probably guilty of abuse. 
Appellant's Failure to Object Does Not Constitute Waiver of His Claim 
In Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785.(L)tah 1992), the Appeals Court, "observed 
that an appellate court will review an allegation of plain error despite the 
9 
lack of a timely objection if the trial court was not led into error. 'We do so 
in order to avoid manifest injustice and because, if the error is obvious, the 
trial court has the opportunity to address the error regardless of the fact 
that it was never brought to the court's attention.'" Moreover, Rule 103(d) 
of Utah Rules of Evidence states, 
"Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting 
substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the 
court." 
In discussing this part of Rule 103, the Appeals Court held that, 
"The plain error rule permits the appellate court to assure that 
Justice is done, even if counsel fails to act to bring a harmfully 
erroneous ruling to the attention of the trial court...The plain error 
rule exists to permit review of trial court rulings as a way of 
protecting a defendant from the harm that can be caused by less-
than-perfect counsel." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155 (UT 1989) 
In the instant case, Petitioner is pro se and that constitutes less than 
perfect counsel. The record will show that Loren never made one 
objection while Oksana's counsel made dozens. This can be attributed to 
Loren's inexperience as a pro se litigant to whom "should be accorded every 
consideration that may reasonably be indulged," Lundahl v. Quinn, 2003 UT 
11,1f3, 67 P.3d 1000 (quotations and citations omitted). 
ISSUE II 
WHETHER THE COURT VIOLATED RULE 610 OF THE RULES OF 
EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED CUMULATIVE ERROR BY ALLOWING 
EVIDENCE DESIGNED TO DENIGRATE AND EMBARRASS 
APPELLANT WITH RESPECT TO HIS RELIGIOUS BELIEFS 
10 
Rule 610 states in relevant part, 
Evidence of the beliefs or opinions of a witness on matters of religion 
is not admissible for the purpose of showing that by reason of their 
nature the witness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. 
Repeatedly, Oksana introduced a highly personal letter written to her at a 
time when reconciliation was being sought (R. 13:11; 19:18; 21:5; 299:12). 
During their marriage, Loren and Oksana had shared sacred religious 
experiences together and Loren had hoped to appeal to that side of her. 
The focus was on one sentence in the letter in which Loren stated that he 
had Christ personally come and visit him. The written affidavit of Oksana 
shows that Oksana introduced this letter with the intent to cast Loren in a 
negative light before the Court, impeach his credibility and make him look 
like a religious zealot, mentally unbalanced and unfit. Using this malicious 
strategy, Joseph Smith the founder of the predominant religion in Utah, 
many of his contemporaries (Wilford Woodruff, John Taylor, Lorenzo 
Snow, etc.) and current church members could be held up to similar 
ridicule and be discredited for having similar experiences. Ironically, 
Oksana had similar experiences of her own while married to Loren and 
now seeks to discredit Loren for his. 
While the Court makes no mention of the evidence in its findings, there 
exists the distinct possibility that this was prejudicial to Loren, given the 
multiple attempts by Oksana to introduce it. Combined with other errors in 
11 
this case, e.g., having Rhett Potter read hearsay comments from Loren's 
first wife regarding her opinion about Loren, visits from extra-terrestials, 
etc. (R. 13:20) and other errors, constitute cumulative error. "When two or 
more harmless errors result in potential prejudice to a defendant, the court 
may find cumulative error." Miller v. Mullin, 354 F.3d 1288, 1301 (10th Cir. 
2004), petition for cert, filed, No. 04-6188 (Sept. 3, 2004); Workman v. 
Mullin, 342 F.3d 1100, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003), cert, denied, 124 S. Ct. 2397 
(2004). 
While Loren did not object to the Rule 610 error, it was obvious error to 
which the Court could have objected on its own cognizance, Emmet, Id. 
Furthermore, these kinds of attacks on Appellant form a pattern and 
practice of bad faith, unclean hands, lack of cooperation and unjustified 
maliciousness. 
ISSUE III 
WHETHER THE COURT MADE CONTRADICTORY AND/OR 
IMPROPER STATEMENTS THAT WERE PREJUDICIAL TO THE 
APPELLANT AND THAT CONSTITUTED PLAIN ERROR AND/OR 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
During cross examination of Oksana by Loren to establish that false 
allegations had been made by Oksana and her witnesses, the Court 
interrupted with these comments: 
12 
Court: "I think you've made your point fairly repeatedly about using the prior 
affidavits that were filed with the Court and I understand the allegations [ of 
abuse] against you have hurt you in the sense that you feel hurt by them, that 
they were made." (R. 148:23)... There's apparently no evidence other than the 
accusations themselves. So I think to go over it repeatedly is just kind of making 
a point repetitively rather than helping your situation any (R. 149:4)... While I 
recognize that there were some strong statements made and they were made in 
court filings, I think your point has been made (R. 149:14)... to me they're just 
accusations without basis. (R. 149:18).. . I want you to understand I'm not going 
to go back through the files and look at those and say, yeah, they were made 
and there must be something to this. (R. 149:23)... What I'm saying is, if it was 
used, it was simply used for the temporary situation. This is the permanent 
decision that I'm making." (R. 150:18). .. Let me just say, I'm getting your point 
is what I'm saying (R. 151:21). 
The Court committed plain error as follows: 
1. By repeatedly telling Loren that he had made his point and that to go on 
had diminishing returns, served as a chilling effect to Loren and misled 
Loren to believe that by getting his point that the Court fully captured 
the significance of the false allegations and that further proof was not 
required. 
2. The Court contradicted itself in later statements made in the Findings of 
the Court, "These accusations are very serious and troubling." (R.I. 
P.750) and that there was a distinct probability that these allegations of 
abuse happened (page 748, Ibid). 
3. Failing to find a nexus between false allegations in the temporary 
custody situation and the decision for permanent custody. This would 
be akin to a Court finding that accusations of a bank robbery or other 
felony crime had no relevance if it only related to temporary custody. 
T h e allegatioi is of abuse and whether they are truthful go to the very 
essence of this matter as testified by Loren (R. 150:7) and as set forth 
in abundant case law (See Loren's r ?F>). 
Fai l i in f by i Utah Court to comprehend the seriousness of false 
accusations, regardless of its timing, is completely out of step with 
sister Courts across t h e coun t i \ i .i id \ ii i i . i ie tin Ui iiiiiii 
tc - Ih ma t te r of temporary custody, the custody evaluator considered it 
an important factor and w a s hesitant to disturb the existing ar rangement 
based on temporary cus to i H- -Heo * 
during the temporary custody arrangement , were designed to bolster 
Oksana 's primary custody of Maria and thus gave her an unfair 
advantage resulting in .i i .mAnie! ul |I< MII .HI IMII « i -itoJv ilm < IIy related 
to the false allegations. 
4. T h e Court committed plain error by distinguishing between allegations 
of abuse mack:! i l i i i i f i i f . i l e i i i p u u i y d i s t u r b ' h c i m i ' i ./mb 11 if MI 
disregarding them in a trial for permanent custody. This is 
contradictory in the sense that Loren raised these false allegations 
i iho> M f ; j -ur Il i ' . IIIIIII mi be fo re ( mnmissioner Garner and the 
Commissioner deferred to rule on them stating that the more 
appropriate forum w a s before the Trial Court during an evidentiary 
h e m ii ii in i ii n HI 1 ii (;• in i mi in i il it - ev iden t ia ry h e a r i n g , t he Trial Court then 
14 
failed to hear or consider all the evidence and give it the full weight that 
it deserved based on the chilling effect of the Court's comments. 
5. The Court characterized Loren's concern about the false allegations as 
being hurtful to Loren in the sense that they hurt Loren's feelings or his 
pride. However, this further demonstrates that the Court failed to 
comprehend that this issue went far beyond the feelings of Loren but 
goes to a strategy frowned on by the Courts, is dishonest, is illegal, is 
not in the child's best interests and causes extreme injury to the victim 
of the false allegations and is manifestly unjust (R. 326:24). 
ISSUE IV 
IN AWARDING SOLE CUSTODY TO THE PETITIONER/APPELLEE, 
WHETHER THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS 
TO LAW IN DECLARING THE PETITIONER TO BE THE MORE 
COOPERATIVE PARENT 
Loren argues that the Court erred as to law and abused its discretion by 
disregarding the weight of the evidence showing that Oksana affirmatively 
and without good cause, was the most uncooperative parent and that, in 
contrast, Appellant sought from the inception of the divorce, a cooperative 
relationship, supported by clear and convincing evidence. 
A summary of uncooperative statements by Oksana and her witnesses is 
found in Addendum 2 and contrasting statements by Loren showing 
cooperativeness. 
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Then, tints- mil rnsl nin nip|' «rliii«i m \n\t r i-\v • • i *)f sirr In/1 mrenorhis 
wife to prevent Maria from having any exposure to Oksana, in spite of their false 
allegations. To the contrary, I 
life of Maria, albeit conditioned on not continuing her false allegations (R. 
337:25). 
In his written and oral testimony, Rhett Potter, custody evaluator, stated 
that he had concerns about Oksana cooperating with Loren. The Court 
refers to it'll i uimi s ami v ^ > f i 
questioned whether Respondent's [Loren] willingness to allow Maria to 
spend time with her mother was genuine or mere lip service." (R.I. pg. ). 
While the pro se Appellan 
basis of speculation, this was speculation nonetheless, unsupported by 
any evidence that showed uncooperativeness or probability of 
uncooperativeness. 
Oksana's statements while under oath about unwillingness to cooperate 
are supported by the evidence offered up by Loren through documentation 
and exl iilils 'hnni'i In "I II i" i If nly nMl in III if bnsl n it*-*rests nf the child for 
sole custody to be awarded to an obviously uncooperative parent. See 
Thurman v. Thurman, 73 Idaho 122,245 P.2d810, . H (iam i nY2) 
( I parent's attempts to alienate affections of non-custodial 
parent from the child constitutes a material change in circumstances). 
In contrast, no evidence, beyond oral testimony and speculation, was 
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offered that show Loren was equally uncooperative. In the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the case at bar,(R.I. page 747) states, 
"The Court finds, based on the testimony of the parties and Rhett Potter, 
that both parties expressed some unwillingness to encourage the parties 
minor child, Maria, to have a good relationship with the other parent... 
However, the Court finds, based on the testimony of Petitioner, that 
Petitioner would be more likely to adhere to the Court's Order (emphasis 
added), even if she is unwilling to go beyond those Orders." 
Thus, the Court only has the oral testimony and bald allegations of Oksana 
to go on while disregarding the clear and convincing evidence of Loren. 
The Court's finding is manifestly contrary to the evidence as cited above. 
In Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, (Utah 1993) reversing the trial court's 
custody decision and noting that, "The record is replete with highly 
disputed evidence relevant to the custody issue which is not dealt with at 
all in the findings. It is reversible error if the trial court fails to make specific 
findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are 'clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the 
judgment,'" Throckmorton, 767 P.2d at 124 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 
P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
No evidence was offered by any party that showed that Loren "expressed 
some unwillingness to encourage ... a good relationship with the other 
parent." (Court Findings, Id.). To the contrary, in Loren's affidavit offered 
at trial at page 694, he stated, 
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"In Exhibits group H, is found abundant evidence [emails to 
Oksana] of my desire for cooperative parenting. Exhibit 13, shows 
my extensive proposal for a "Win Win" solution provided to Rhett 
Potter which enumerates the many advantages of equal, shared 
parenting supported by statistical and scholarly studies extolling the 
virtues of shared parenting. [Appellant's] Exhibits group H (Trial 
Court Exhibits ), shows numerous emails that I sent to Oksana in 
which I share photos and in other ways seek cooperation. Oksana 
maliciously rejected these overtures and never reciprocated. 
Oksana's behavior and words are diametrically opposed to the intent 
and spirit of Utah law encouraging cooperative parenting." Loren, in 
oral testimony, stated, "I sent emails to Oksana, to Maria's teachers. 
Never reciprocated...." (R. 336:1-6) 
In Loren's trial affidavit at R.I. page 699, stated, 
"I am fully aware of Maria's love and bonding with her mother and as 
such, in her best interests, I would encourage freguent and 
meaningful contact between Maria and her mother to the extent that 
such contact is not harmful." 
No such offer was made by Oksana. In fact, to the contrary ( 
e parental rights ild be denied to Loren (R. 
88:13; 145:11). In Kanth v Kanth, 2002 Utah App 415, the Appeals Court, 
in reviewing conflicting evidence and denying Husband's appeal, stated, 
"I he imlv alln native evidence to support a finding to the contrary was the 
bald allegation of Husband." Contrary to Kanth, Loren has offered 
substantial evidence, other than bald allegation, In iippnii i nnmmi m 
cooperatk .^rt and uncooperation on the part of Oksana. 
Contrary to Kanth, the Court has used bald allegations of Oksana to 
support its finding that Oksana is the more cooperative parent and Hi. il 
I in PI 11«, inn i ioperative. "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in 
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divorce matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal 
precedence." Childs v Childs, 967 P.2d 942, (Utah1998). The Court 
violates legal precedence set forth in Kanth requiring more than bald 
allegation to support a finding. 
Evidence of Pattern and Practice of Uncooperativeness with Father of 
Alina 
The Court refers to the emails from Oksana to Loren while she was in 
Ukraine and prior to their marriage. (R.I. p.750). While expressing some 
concern, the Court concludes that it was not serious or matter of great 
weight by stating that: 
1. Conflicting evidence existed as to whether Oksana "needed to obtain 
government permission to leave Ukraine with Maria" (R.I. at p.750). 
(The Appellant assumes that the Court meant "Alina", Oksana's 
daughter from her first marriage, as Maria never resided in Ukraine and 
is the subject of the custody dispute.) 
2. There is no evidence that Alina's biological father has made a claim that 
Alina was kidnapped or that he objected in any way. 
3. Oksana gave oral testimony that she had no intention of taking Maria 
illegally out of the country. (R.I. p. 751). 
As to the first point, Appellant entered evidence that the U.S. Embassy 
does require the permission of the biological father before a child can 
leave the country. (Ad. 4). This requirement is unconditional unless proof 
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of death or missing status of the father is provided. In contrast, the Court 
relied on the oral testimony of Oksana that she had a divorce document 
giving her plenary parental mihl < .mil innn In II n lm ilmm, il L ill H I I K. 
98:10). No such document was ever offered into evidence. Loren found 
the Ukrainian divorce after trial (Ad. 5) and while it does give Oksana sole 
custody of Alina, it does n< ) 
visitation to the father as alleged by Oksana. It does not explicitly waive 
the requirement to obtain written permission to remove the child from the 
country. T<-> n™< reweigi 
evidence to the contrary is in violation of Kanth, Id. and is plain error. 
As to the second point, the Court errs in saying that "there is no evidence" 
that the biological fatht inn i"."iii| \i^> i> f""" i •'. • um r.iv»Mi 
the many admissions by Oksana in her emails that Alina's father (Valari) 
wanted to be part of Alina's life (R. 93:20; 97:16; 99:21; 1U6.13, 106:15) 
and the great length'. IIi iM »l ' in i • ni l In 11 i n '"Inn r, dr-imrliirn secret 
and to deceptively leave Ukraine without his permission (R. 95:6; 95:23; 
100:1; 103:3; 104:1; 105:8; ), it is manifestly obvious that Alina's father 
v •• ' , -n!" had he known. 
As to the third point, the past is the best predictor of the future. The Court 
erred in relying on the bald testimony of Oksana against the documented 
eviden Oksana established in her email 
correspondence with Loren that she is willing and capable of taking a 
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biological child from his/her father without his knowledge or permission. 
Oksana's subterfuge and lack of regard for international law provides clear 
and convincing evidence that impeaches Oksana's credibility during oral 
testimony. 
Thus, the evidence for finding in favor of the Petitioner in this case is 
"completely lacking or so slight and unconvincing as to make the [decision] 
plainly unreasonable and unjust." Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425, 433 
(Utah 1998). 
Legally Inadequate 
Nevertheless, the Court, in writing its decision, said, "There is no evidence 
that petitioner [Oksana] is deficient parent in any respect." (R.I. p. 725 ) 
In reaching such an all encompassing conclusion, the Court failed to offer 
sufficient subsidiary facts and discussion to explain why it came to that 
conclusion and therefore is legally inadequate. In its Findings of Fact, the 
Court fails to explain why the bald testimony of Oksana was sufficient to 
support its findings while there was no mention of the evidence offered by 
Loren. Barnes v. Barnes. 857 P.2d 257 (holding that the failure of trial 
courts to make adequate findings has been a reoccurring problem in 
custody appeals). "The threshold consideration on review is whether the 
trial court's findings are adequate to support its custody award." Roberts v. 
Roberts, 835 P.2d 193, 195 (Utah App. 1992). If the findings are legally 
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inadequate the exercise of marshalling the evidence in support of the 
findings becomes futile and the appellant is under no obligation to marshal. 
Woodward . ). 
Ni re the findings of the Trial Court inadequate, the Court's 
findings are not supported by the evidence. When the Court's findings are 
obviously contrary to or unsupported by the evidence, II us i u. id ieb I »* • v< •' •< I 
thou I »n i, irl discretion and falls within the ambit of flagrantly unjust and is 
an abuse of discretion. Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah 
1982) holding that where a decision 
abuse of discretion should the appellate forum interpose its own 
judgment." 
The Court has discretion to assign weight 
in awarding custody. In this case, by referencing the more cooperative 
parent doctrine as provided for in Utah Code , the Court, to avoid abuse of 
discretion, has a du I 
courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce matters so long as the 
decision is within the confines of legal precedence." Childs v Childs, Ibid. 
Legislators ai -Kites recognize that the parent who 
intentionally sabotages the relationship between a parent and a child, 
without evidence to support a showing of harm to the child, is highly 
destruc it. 
E.g., In re Marriage of Donly, 528 N.W.2d 663 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) 
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(proper to award custody to father where he had not tried to disparage 
mother in the presence of the minor child); In re Marriage of Kunkel, 546 
N.W.2d 634 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996) (proper to award custody to father where 
mother made false allegations of abuse against father); Campbell v. 
Campbell, 604 A.2d 33 (Me. 1992) (court may consider parent's attempt to 
gain a tactical advantage in custody matter by filing false abuse charges 
against other parent); Seidman v. Seidman, 226 A.D.2d 1011, 641 
N.Y.S.2d 431 (1996) (proper to award custody to mother where father had 
difficulty in engaging in cooperative decision making with respect to 
children); Jones v. Jones, 185 A.D.2d 228, 586 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1992) 
(proper to award custody to father where mother was not able to cooperate 
with father to further children's best interests). Thus, our society, as a 
whole, assigns great weight to the issue of which parent is the more 
cooperative parent. In the instant case, while the degree of weight 
assigned is unknown, the Court, failed to properly consider the evidence 
that preponderates in favor of the Appellant. 
Legal Error 
As to law, the Court failed to comply with the provisions of the Utah 
Code Utah Code 30-3-32 that state in relevant part, 
(1)lt is the intent of the Legislature to promote parent-time at a level 
consistent with all parties' interests. 
(2) (a) A court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of 
the child and the parent who is the victim of domestic or family 
violence. 
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(b) Absent a showing by a preponderance of evidence of real harm 
or substantiated potential harm to the child: 
(i) it is in the best interests of the child of divorcing, divorced, or 
adjudicated parents to have frequent, meaningful, and continuing 
access to each parent following separation or divorce; 
(ii) each divorcing, separating, or adjudicated parent is entitled to 
and responsible for frequent, meaningful, and continuing access with 
his child consistent with the child's best interests; and 
(iii) it is in the best interests of the child to have both parents actively 
involved in parenting the child. 
The Coi irt errs in not finding a showing, by a preponderance of evidence, 
of real harm or substantial real harm or substantiated potential harm to the 
child sufficient to deny the child frequent, meaningful, and continuing 
access to each parent. Appellant asserts that sole custody to Oksana and 
minimum visitation to Appellant does not fall within that definition of 
"meaningful and frequent1 IIUMIHI in-ekih , ,unin I tin lit• •,l interests of 
the child. 
ISSUE V 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING EVIDENCE OF 
VIOLENT AND UNCOOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR ON PART OF 
OKSANA'S MOTHER AND ITS HARMFUL EFFECT ON THE BEST 
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 
( Diii.pn in HI I ilr i ill Iii mi tin I'niiil' F iinliiii i ill I irt s. is discussion of 
police reports offered by Appellant into evidence showing a long pattern 
and practice of uncooperative behavior (Ad. 6). Most significant, was a 
|\/l/iy l.l, '/!()IJL* polKD i e| K. II I m wvliu h |li( i-,t.'lilioner'c mother, Olena 
Skripnik, was handcuffed by a North Ogden Police Officer during an 
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incident in which she refused Loren parent time with his daughter and was 
done in the presence of the child. Loren testified under oath the 
circumstances surrounding the incident and entered the police report into 
evidence (R. 285:23). 
See Sigg v. Sigg, 905 P.2d 908, (1995) (upon reversing and awarding 
custody to the non-custodial father, the Court noted, "Such behavior [by 
the mother and boyfriend] evinces not only contempt for Mr. Sigg [the 
father], but also a willingness to involve the children,"). Likewise, Oksana, 
in company with her mother (and later her older daughter), sought to 
withhold visitation with Loren's daughter and did so through force and 
violence. 
Additionally, the Appellant offered into evidence other police reports where 
Oksana and her mother were uncooperative (R.287:10). In stark contrast, 
there exists no police reports or other documented evidence that show 
violent and uncooperative behavior on Loren's part. By no stretch of the 
imagination can a reasonable person conclude that it is in the best interest 
of a child to be in the sole custody of a violent grandmother and daughter 
team who unjustifiably interfere with custody and who are observed by a 
police officer to be the perpetrator of violence. "A finding is clearly 
erroneous when, even though there is evidence to support it, the 
reviewing court is 'left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
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has burn urn Il i i l St;Mf " Walker, • n i987)as 
cited in Shindler v. Shindler, 776 P.2d 84, (Utah 1989). 
This is not a matter of "he said/she said" with equally conflicting evidence 
fo OT no evidence to support the 
proposition that Oksana is the more cooperative parent. In fact, the 
evidence heavily preponderates against Oksana. 
Acustoili.il |'lull ill' iiilli ilnlil, regarding visitation may in itself constitute a 
material change in circumstances. See Norenberg v. Norenberg, 168 
N.W.2d 794, 797 (Iowa 1969) (holding conflict between non-custodial 
r - visitation upset child and 
constituted a material change in circumstances); Pulley v. Pulley, 587 So. 
2d 116, 120 (La. App. 1991) (affirming finding of material change in 
c jstodial mother "seized virtually every 
opportunity to deny [non-custodial father] his court-ordered visitation 
privileges or to make the exercise of those privileges inconvenient or 
frustralimi " I , sn- RKI. Hfiini.sillu 797 P.2d at 1209; Ash, 622 So. 2d at 
1267; Amedei, 801 S.W.2d at 493. 
ISSU^ . . 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY 
THAT ABUSE MAY HAVE Of (URRED BY APPELLANT IN THE FACE 
OF THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE THAT 
PREPONDERATES TO THEIR FALSITY. 
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The Court states on page 748 under (3) Findings by the Court re: 
Respondent (as written by the Petitioner's counsel), "...the Court hereby 
finds that there is a distinct possibility that they [the incidents of abuse by 
Loren] 'may have' occurred, particularly since they are referred to in the 
Decree of Divorce from Respondent's first marriage." The Decree of 
Divorce on which the Court relies for evidence, occurred over 19 years ago 
and the abuse alleged by Loren's first wife, Tania Pearce, is unsupported 
and her credibility impeachable. There is no documented evidence or 
admission by me that such ongoing abuse throughout the marriage 
occurred. As in the instant case, the Florida Court merely took the 
language from the opposing counsel and adopted it. No police, medical, 
psychiatric or social worker reports of abuse were ever offered into 
evidence nor do they exist because such allegations of abuse are false. 
Had such evidence existed, Oksana would have produced it. Oksana 
provided an affidavit that Loren had been seen by a famed psychiatrist 
who was also a talk show host for a period of 5 years and that Loren had 
"severe psychological problems". (Ad. 3). Yet, the famed psychiatrist was 
not named nor was any documentation offered to support this allegation. 
The Appellant asserts that he never visited any psychiatrist and has no 
idea who they are talking about. This forms a pattern and practice of false 
allegations maliciously machined to wrongfully sway the broad discretion of 
the Court. 
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False Allegations bv Tania Pearce. Loren's First Wife 
During testimony before the Court, Loren strenuously denied these 
allegations of abuse (R. 212:12) and (R. 288:25; 289:4; 324:8-16) and 
offered into evidence items that impeach the credibility of Oksana's key 
witness and Loren's first wife, Tania Pearce . Among the many false 
allegations made by Tania Pearce, was statement in her written affidavit 
that, 
"Loren barricaded himself behind the door with a gun and when the police 
arrived, they told me they could not do anything because he had a gun". 
(Ad. 3) 
This is obviously false. A reasonable person knows that there does not 
exist a police force in this nation that would back down to someone with a 
gun barricading himself in a house. This nor any event remotely 
resembling it, that involves Loren, ever happened. No police or news 
report exists to verify such a dramatic, news making event. Several other 
unsupported or verifiably false statements were made by Tania Pearce 
which are found in Addendum 15. 
The Court, sua sponte, and without the necessity of objection by the Pro 
Se Appellant, should have recognized that these events were manifestly 
false on their face and should have so noted in its Findings. Ordinarily, 
failure to object to improper remarks constitutes a waiver of the claim, 
"unless the remarks constitute plain error." Emmett, 839 P.2d at 785. In 
Emmett, the Appeals Court, "observed that an appellate court will review 
an allegation of plain error despite the lack of a timely objection if the trial 
court was not led into error. 'We do so in order to avoid manifest injustice 
and because, if the error is obvious, the trial court has the opportunity to 
address the error regardless of the fact that it was never brought to the 
court's attention.'" Id. In this case, plain error was committed in failing to 
catch or comment on obvious error. 
If Oksana's witness is capable of lying about these events, her entire 
testimony should be questioned but the Court committed plain error in 
failing to do so. Courts have considered several factors in determining 
whether to exclude, under Rule 403 of the Rules of Evidence, 
impeachment evidence otherwise admissible under Rule 608(b): 
remoteness of the evidence, importance of credibility, probative value of 
the evidence, likelihood that the prior misconduct actually occurred, and 
whether the evidence is inflammatory. See 28 Charles Alan Wright & Victor 
James Gold, Federal Practice [946 P2d Page 723]. Under the remoteness 
factor, the credibility and weight of the evidence fails as it allegedly 
occurred over 22 years ago. As to importance of credibility, witness' 
credibility was critical to Petitioner's case. Oksana paid for her travel from 
Florida to Utah. She was a lynchpin in her case. The lack of corroborating 
evidence in this case made the credibility of Tania Pearce very important. 
Cf. United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383 (11th Cir. 1982) 
29 
(concluding that trial court erred in excluding impeachment of witness 
whose testimony was "the lynchpin to the governments case"). The key 
witness, Loren's first wife, use of false incidents are highly probative of 
untruthfulness. See United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1477 (8th Cir. 
1994) ("If a man would lie about his name, a jury may reasonably infer that 
he would lie about other matters, even on the witness stand."). While the 
lies were not about a name, it was a lie about an event that never occurred 
and intended to prejudice Loren without probable cause. 
As to the inflammatory factor, the witness, under cross-examination, was 
asked about an incident of violent abuse that she perpetrated, (R. 317:24) 
Loren: "Do you remember climbing up into the second or I don't know 
what it's called, it's over the cab where we had a bed, a queen sized bed 
over the cab of the motor home, do you remember that?" 
Tania: "No." 
Loren: "Okay. Do you remember grabbing a gun and 
attempting to shoot me with that gun?" 
Tania: "I wish I did, but no, I don't remember that" 
Any reasonable person would be alarmed by such an inflammatory 
comment. A Court would not countenance or let pass without reaction a 
similar comment made by a man towards a woman. Certainly, the idea of 
threatening somebody with a gun as an ex-parte means of settling a matter 
casts serious doubt on the credibility of such a person. 
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Likewise, Tania Pearce during cross-examination corroborated her desire 
for violence up to and including murder, (R. 319:1) 
Loren: "And do you remember your reaction when I came home? 
What did you do? Do you remember throwing chairs at me?" 
Tania: "With my experience today, I would have done a lot 
worse." 
The Court abused its discretion in failing to note or react to the comment 
made from the witness stand. Rhetorically, would any Court tolerate 
similar comments from the Appellant during open court? 
Upon cross-examination of Loren's sister, Charlene Stott, opposing 
counsel, Terry Spencer, asked her what motive Loren's ex-wife would 
have to lie and Charlene responded, that it was for revenge and money. 
(R.242:14). 
With money and revenge as motives, the trial Court improperly relied on 
testimony of Tania Pearce in reaching its decision and in not impeaching 
the credibility of the witness by and through virtue of her prejudice and bias 
and failed to consider the relation by previous marriage. In Wanstreet v. 
Wanstreet, 847 N.E.2d 716, (2006), the Court noted, "It is settled law that 
a witness is not equally available to a party if there is a likelihood that the 
witness would be biased against him, as, for example, a relative of the 
other party. (Citing also Moore v. Bellamy, 183 III. App. 3d 110, 118-19, 
538 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (1989); Chapman v. Foggy, 59 III. App. 3d 552, 
31 
559, 375 N.E.2d 865, 870 (1978). "It is well-established that '[a] party to an 
action or proceeding, either civil or criminal, may elicit from an opposing 
witness on cross-examination particular facts having a logical tendency to 
show that the witness is biased against him or his cause.'" State ex. rel. 
Everett v. Hardy, 65 N.C. App. 350, 352, 309 S.E.2d 280, 282 (1983) 
False Accusations of Abuse by Alina Zapassoff 
In declaring that the "there is a distinct possibility that they [the incidents of 
abuse during the marriage with Oksana] 'may have' occurred" as 
perpetrated by the Appellant, the Court errs in failing to discuss the 
preponderance of evidence that weighs against Oksana and her co-
conspirators. The Court construed a nexus between the allegations of 
abuse made by Appellee and the best interests of the child, and in so 
doing, the Court is under obligation to consider all the evidence and 
support its findings with adequate discussion. The Court committed plain 
error in failing to do so. 
The Court erred in failing to include in it's findings a discussion of 
testimony by Rhett Potter, Custody Evaluator, in which he stated, that he 
had been an investigator of abuse for the state and gave little credence to 
the claim of hundreds of beatings (R. 35:12-16). Such a statement by an 
expert witness, one called by Oksana, preponderates against the Court's 
proposition that abuse was probably committed by Loren. However, Mr. 
Potter later minimizes the false allegations as "teenage hyprivoly [sp]" 
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(R. 35:18). Such hyperbole of teenage girls has caused great harm to 
adult males. Loren testified to the incalculable harm and potential harm of 
such false allegations (R. 266:15; 327:6). It is manifestly unjust for the 
Court to disregard the seriousness of her allegations or to regard them as 
innocent "hyperbole". Alina testified that she understood exactly what she 
was saying, that she is of above average intelligence and is taking 
advanced math. As such, she fully comprehends what the number 270 
means and cannot hide behind "teenage hyperbole". Adden. 13 more fully 
sets forth the documentable false statements made by Alina under oath. 
A reasonable person, upon hearing of severe, unrelenting abuse with a 
leather belt on a "innumerable" occasions and at least 270 times, would 
conclude that such abuse would be utterly devastating to a child with 
obvious physical and mental results that cannot be hidden. The evidence 
indicates the opposite, with Alina excelling in school as a straight "A" 
student, recipient of scholastic honors and active in church while living with 
Loren (R. 161:23). Testimony showed that Alina was active in dance, 
swimming and other activities where any marks would be disclosed. 
Dozens of photos with Alina in swimsuits and other skimpy clothes were 
offered into evidence to show that she was not hiding marks from these 
alleged severe beatings with a belt. In stark contrast, no evidence other 
than the bald allegation was offered to support the allegation of even one 
incident, much less "innumerable" incidents of abuse. So overwhelming is 
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the manifest weight of the evidence against Alina and her allegations that it 
is plain error and manifestly unjust for the trial court to ignore such 
evidence and rule in favor of the Appellee. 
While the Appellate Court may be loath to review evidence de novo, the 
Appellant urges that they do, in the interest of justice. "It is reversible error 
if the trial court fails to make specific findings on all material issues unless 
the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of 
supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment," Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 
at 124 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). 
False Allegations by Oksana Zapassoff 
In an affidavit on record with the Court, Oksana testified that, "I swear 
before the court and God, that all the facts that Alina and I have provided 
to the court...are all true." (Ad. 3, P.7, item 20). As such, Oksana is 
complicit with Alina in the false allegations. Additionally, Oksana 
perpetrated many false allegations of her own. The Court committed plain 
error and abused its discretion in failing to consider the false allegations 
made by Oksana and her many inconsistencies as enumerated in 
Addendum 14. 
Coached testimony by Maria Pearce 
Oksana's counsel offered into evidence a transcript of the DCFS 
investigator which he asked Loren's son, Ammon, to read, (R. 231:20). 
The language of the transcript shows that Maria, who was 4 or less years 
34 
old at the time of the alleged abuse, told the DCFS investigator that she 
personally witnessed the beatings of her brother Ammon and that she saw 
the scars from the beatings. Ammon denied this and said that any scars 
he had came from skateboarding and other youthful activities, not from 
beatings (R. 232:17). After trial, Loren once again asked Maria why she 
said that. She responded that her mother and Alina had told her what 
happened and she believed them. Loren asked her if she actually saw 
any beatings herself and she said no. While this may be dismissed as a 
"he said/she said" stalemate, Appellant urges the Appellate Court to 
consider this in light of all the evidence: 
1. Ammon denies ever being beaten or having any scars from beatings. 
(R. 233:5) 
2. Ammon had his own cell phone on which he could have called for help 
at any time he chose (R.230:10). Furthermore, he had many 
opportunities to report abuse at school, at church and with his many 
friends and cousins. 
3. The many inconsistencies and contradictions in Appellee and her 
witness' testimonies show a motivation to lie and coach Maria to lie. 
In "Interference with Parental Rights of Noncustodial Parent as Grounds 
for Modification of Child Custody" by Edward B. Borris, Divorce Litigation. 
January, 1997, p. 1, the author quotes notable custody expert, Dr. Richard 
Gardner, clinical professor of child psychiatry,." These days, according to 
Gardner, 90 percent of the abuse allegations that come up in custody 
cases are false, and this is almost always the result of "parental 
programming" by the mother, which he considers a form of child abuse. 
"You can convince a child of anything," he argues. "You can make them 
believe anything you want." In Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305 
(1991), the Utah court found that Mr. Peterson, by "repeatedly coaching 
his daughter to make false reports of sexual abuse and repeatedly 
coaching her to denounce her mother, is abusing a child psychologically by 
causing her to have ill feelings about her mother." 
The courts have held that an official investigation by a state agency that 
concludes in its finding that accusations of abuse as being unsupported is 
sufficient grounds by itself for the Court to make a finding of false accusations. In 
re Marriage of Peller, No. G031826 (Cal.App. Dist.4 01/21/2004), a mother filed 
two false accusation against the father one of which included shoving a block of 
wood in the child's mouth. This accusation was investigated by child protective 
services and was considered unfounded. In awarding sole custody to the father 
and monitored visitation to the mother, "The [trial] court finds that it psl not 
believable that chapped lips were mistaken for sticks or potentially splinters in the 
mouth." While only one "not believable" incident of abuse was required to award 
custody to the father, the instant case reveals many incidents and reasons for not 
believing the accusations of Oksana and her co-conspirators, including a 
thorough investigation by Utah DCFS and a conclusion of unsupported. On 
appeal, the California court stated that, "the court assessed Kerry's [mother] 
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credibility and found it lacking. Implicit in that order is the court's conclusion it 
was not in Cameron's [child] best interest to be with a mother who was falsely 
accusing the father of child abuse. Nothing further is necessary." The appeals 
court also concludes, "despite all evidence to the contrary, she [mother] holds to 
the belief that Cameron is 'unsafe' in Brian's home; and she surrounds herself 
with family members supportive of her perceptions, which find little, if any, basis 
in reality." (Id). This is on point with the instant case where Oksana has stated 
repeatedly and without any evidence that Maria is unsafe in Loren's house (R. 
145:16) and is supported by her family members but without anything other than 
bald allegation. 
ISSUE VII 
WHETHER FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF ABUSE ARE GRAVE ENOUGH 
TO OPERATE AGAINST THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD AND 
REQUIRE A DIFFERENT AWARD OF CUSTODY. 
While courts have broad discretion in determining the weight of many factors in 
divorce and custody decisions, their broad discretion is not absolute and is 
constrained by legal precedence. Under the legal precedence constraint, the 
appellate court has ruled, "Trial courts may exercise broad discretion in divorce 
matters so long as the decision is within the confines of legal precedence." 
Whitehead v. Whitehead, 836 P.2d 814, 816 (Utah Ct.App. 1992). Legal 
precedence is overwhelmingly for the proposition that false allegations of abuse 
inherently operate against the best interests of the child and therefore, receives 
the highest weight in custody decisions. The trial court failed to consider the 
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plethora of case law presented by Loren that supported the proposition that false 
allegations operate against the best interests of the child. 
The Vermont Supreme Court stated it well, "Across the country, the great weight 
of authority holds that conduct by one parent that tends to alienate the child's 
affections from the other is so inimical to the child's welfare as to be grounds for 
a denial of custody to, or a change of custody from, the parent guilty of 
such conduct. See generally Annotation, Alienation of Child's Affections 
as Affecting Custody Award, 32 A.L.R.2d 1005 (1953)" Renaud v. Renaud (97-
366); 168 Vt. 306; 721 A.2d 463 (1998). The Vermont Court further noted, "a 
child's best interests are plainly furthered by nurturing the child's relationship with 
both parents, and a sustained course of conduct by one parent designed to 
interfere in the child's relationship with the other casts serious doubt upon the 
fitness of the offending party to be the custodial parent. See Young v. Young, 
628 N.Y.S.2d 957, 958 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (interference with relationship 
between child and noncustodial parent raises "a strong possibility that the 
offending party is unfit to act as a custodial parent") (quoting Maloney v. 
Maloney, 617 N.Y.S.2d 190, 191 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)); see also McAdams v. 
McAdams, 530 N.W.2d 647, 650 (N.D. 1995) ("A parent who willfully alienates 
a child from the other parent may not be awarded custody based on that 
alienation."). ... And although stability is undoubtedly important, the short-term 
disruption occasioned by a change of custody may be more than compensated 
by the long-term benefits of a healthy relationship with both parents." (Ibid). The 
Vermont Court in its in-depth analysis went on to say, "A more subtle, but no less 
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invidious, form of interference in parent-child relations may take the form of 
persistent allegations of physical or sexual abuse. In Young, for example, the 
court reversed an award of custody to the mother where the trial court had 
inexplicably ignored uncontradicted evidence that the mother had filed numerous 
false accusations of sexual abuse by the father. As the court observed, "[t]hese 
repeated uncorroborated and unfounded allegations of sexual abuse brought by 
the mother against the father cast serious doubt upon her fitness to be the 
custodial parent." 628 N.Y.S.2d at 962. Other decisions are to similar effect. 
See, e.g., Lewin, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 437 n.4 (change of custody compelled where 
mother had "made numerous bizarre, outrageous and totally unfounded 
accusations" of child abuse against father); Ellis v. Ellis, 747 S.W.2d 711, 715 
(Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (change of custody justified where mother had "used the 
device of making a false accusation of sexual abuse against [father] as a 
weapon to cut off his access to [the child]"). The Court declared that only in 
cases where a parent acted in "good faith" in reporting child abuse later found to 
be unsupported, might they be spared a change in custody. To be "good faith", 
the parent must have diligently sought a remedy or professional assistance at the 
time they first became aware of the abuse. Oksana's own testimony shows she 
knew of the abuse early in the marriage (See Addendum 14) and never sought 
professional help nor reported it until time of the custody evaluation, an obvious 
attempt to gain an unfair advantage in court. The manifest weight of evidence is 
so compelling towards "bad faith" on the part of Oksana as to shock the 
conscience of any reasonable person. 
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ISSUE VIII 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON THE PREGNANCY 
OF APPELLANT'S WIFE AS A REASON FOR DENYING CUSTODY OF 
MARIA TO APPELLANT WHILE DISPARATELY FAILING TO 
CONSIDER CONCURRENT PREGNANCY OF APPELLEE. 
In its Findings, the Court stated, 
"any advantage of having the stepmother [Loren's wife] provide care is 
outweighed by the stresses that the stepmother is currently facing in the 
adjustment to life in the United States and the birth of her first child. 
Overall this factor favors Petitioner as the custodian parent." (R.I. @ 750). 
The Appellant asserts that: (1) The negative effects of pregnancy and its 
alleged stresses are mere speculation by the Court, unsupported by any 
expert or medical evidence . (2) This is disparate treatment on two counts: 
(a) Oksana was also pregnant having delivered on December 12, 2006 
and (b) Oksana also was relativelv new to the country and her fitness as a 
parent was never in question or relevant to the Court. 
Oksana failed to disclose her pregnancy to either the custody evaluator or 
to the court. If she failed to disclose her pregnancy because she deemed 
it as not relevant, then that prejudices the Appellant in that the Court failed 
to balance the two pregnancies against each other. Loren had already 
raised the pregnancy of his wife as positive factor in his Affidavit at time of 
trial, 
i) "Maria has a strong bonding to my wife, her step-mother Olga 
(Exhibits group D). My wife does not work and is available to 
Maria for full time attention, care and education throughout the 
year. Contrary to Mother's allegations, my wife does speak 
sufficient English and is at a similar level to what Oksana was 
when she began teaching. Additionally, we are expecting a child 
which will be a new sibling for Maria. Maria is very excited about 
the prospect of a new brother or sister and wants to be intimately 
involved in her baby sibling's care." (R.I. @ 690) 
Oksana could have rebutted this argument if she were not pregnant, 
arguing the negative aspects of pregnancy. She did not disclose her own 
pregnancy which the Appellant asserts is more evidence of her 
untruthfulness and leaves Appellant at a disadvantage on a substantive 
issue on which the trial court relied. 
ISSUE IX 
WHETHER THE COURT ERRED AND/OR ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
FINDING THAT APPELLANT IS NOT A RESPONSIBLE PARENT 
BASED ON WHAT THE COURT DEEMED TO BE CREDIBLE 
EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT HAD NOT PAID HIS CHILD SUPPORT 
FROM A PREVIOUS MARRIAGE 
The Court stated, 
"The Court finds that there is credible evidence that respondent is indeed 
significantly in arrears on child support owed to his first family. The failure 
to support his family from his first wife casts respondent [Loren] in a 
negative light and must be taken into consideration by the court as a factor 
in determining who is the more responsible parent to have custody of 
Maria." (Ex.2 @7) 
The Courts reasoning is plain error on several grounds: 
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1. For credible evidence, the Court relies on a Notice of Lien (as 
discussed in Issue # 1) on file with the Weber County Recorders Office 
that the Court claims shows an "astronomical amount of $100,324.47". ( 
R.I. , p. 750). However, anybody, with or without good cause, can file 
a lien against anybody. The Appellee and her co-conspirators filed the 
lien shortly before trial. Appellant did not become aware of it in time to 
get it dismissed prior to trial (R. 339:19) but has subsequently had it 
dismissed (Ad. 12). As testified in court, the Appellant showed that the 
lien was filed by a private collection agency, CSE, and that it was an 
illegal and naked lien unsupported by documentation or itemized 
accounting of how it arrived at its claim. Upon dismissing the lien, the 
4th District Court, Provo, ordered that the lien be voided and that legal 
costs of $255 be reimbursed to Appellant. CSE promptly paid the $255 
and never requested a hearing to dispute Appellant's objection. The 
trial court erred in relying on the lien as credible evidence. 
2. The Court relies on oral testimony of Appellant's first wife. As has 
already been shown above, first wife's testimony should not be found to 
be credible or admissible. 
3. The Court errs in concluding that there was a "failure to support his 
family from his first wife" and the Court fails to acknowledge any 
payment of support. The Court is here declaring that there was no 
payment of support. The Appellant offered several evidences why the 
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money wasn't owed and even overpayment of child support which the 
court rejected. (R.339:23). By relying only on the testimony of the first 
wife, who was a biased witness, and by relying on an illegal and 
dismissed lien, the Court caused great harm to the Appellant and to the 
best interests of the child by awarding sole custody to Appellee and 
reducing the association between parent and child. 
4. While precedent has given the Court broad discretion in considering 
many factors in making a custody determination, the Court has been 
given specific guidelines that should be considered as found in 
Hutchison and Rules of Judicial Administration. Failure to pay child 
support is not found among them. A search of relevant case law does 
not show a precedent for denying custody on the basis of failure to pay 
all or part child support in a previous marriage. Assuming arguendo, 
the Appellant failed to pay some support, there exists no nexus either 
by law or by precedent that an arrearage in child support makes a 
parent less responsible or less fit. What is on record and what is 
relevant is the fact that Appellant has been paying support for Maria for 
the over 3 years. 
ISSUE X 
IN THE ALTERNATIVE , WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF 
SOLE CUSTODY TO THE APPELLEE AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE COURT'S ORDER COMPLY WITH THE CONSTITUTIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES AND UTAH AND OTHER RELEVANT STATUTES 
AND WHETHER ANY STATUTES OR COLOR OF LAW RELIED ON BY 
THE COURT ARE IN CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLIANCE. 
The Appellant urges the Appellate Court to find that the Trial Court 
committed reversable error by awarding sole custody to the Appellee and 
by not awarding parental rights, including joint legal custody, to the 
Appellant, while disregarding the manifest weight of the evidence that 
preponderates against the Appellee and in favor of the Appellant. 
Therefore, under the best interests of the child standard, a reversal of 
custody to the Appellant would be in the best interests of the child. 
However, in the alternative and not mutually exclusive to the best interests 
of the child, the Appellant raised a constitutional challenge at trial to any 
decision that would remove, reduce, deny or otherwise eliminate the rights 
of parenthood, absent a showing of substantial harm to the child. The 
Appellant asserts that any legislative scheme or color of law that would 
deny a parent equal access to his/her child is blatantly unconstitutional and 
is subject to the heightened scrutiny required for protection of fundamental 
liberty interests. "We have recognized on numerous occasions that the 
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected." Quillon 
v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 @ 255 (1978). "The liberty interest at issue in this 
case...the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
44 
children...is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests 
recognized by this Court." Troxel v. Granvilles 530 U.S. 57 (2000). The 
Appellant has previously raised the constitutional issues in his 
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Counter Claim, April, 2003 with 
abundant case law and argument. Constitutional issues and parental rights 
were again raised at trial (R. 336:21). The Trial Court took the cogent 
position that the best interest of the child is the only standard under which 
a court will review a custody decision and ignored any constitutional 
challenges. 
Absent a clear and convincing showing of substantial harm to the child, the 
Court should not deny parental rights under the pretext of the best 
interests standard. The interests of the state to promote judicial economy 
under the lowered scrutiny of the preponderance of evidence standard 
must yield to the much weightier and constitutionally protected rights of a 
parent to the care and nurture of their child. Absent a showing of 
substantial harm by a heightened scrutiny afforded by clear and convincing 
evidence, the only shared parenting arrangement that is constitutionally 
compliant is a presumption of equal and joint physical and legal custody. 
Parents are afforded much greater protection in Utah courts under 
circumstances not involving divorce such as in Juvenile Court, Department 
of Chidren and Family Services, etc. where heightened scrutiny is 
required. However, there is no compelling state interest to carve out 
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divorce as a unique circumstance. In spite of the dilemna of Solomon, 
where the competing interests of two battling parents place the Courts in 
an awkward position, the fundamental liberty interests of parents are not 
somehow magically extinguished and yielded to the best interests of the 
child standard wherein the Courts have broad discretion to violate those 
parental rights. 
Across the country, there is growing momentum by disenfranchised 
parents, mostly fathers, to claim the Supreme Court sanctioned 
fundamental liberty interests. More and more cases are being removed to 
Federal Court and eventually, through class action or otherwise, will 
overcome the Rooker-Feldman, 11 th Amendment and other obstacles to 
the granting of a presumption of joint physical and legal custody, absent a 
showing of harm under heightened scrutiny. 
Custody of the Child to Appellant Complies with Best Interest 
Standard and Complies with Constitutional Heightened Scrutiny 
Since the inception of the divorce proceedings, the Appellant has sought 
the best interests of the child by: 
1. Seeking court mandated conciliation under Utah Code and the doctrine 
that the ultimate best interests of the child is to remain in a healthy and 
intact family where marriage is sacred and both parents have equal 
access to the child. The case file at bar will show that Oksana rejected 
marriage counselling and was the initiator of divorce. 
2. Seeking court ordered mediation. Appellant offered a joint custody 
situation which was vigorously rejected by Appellee with no counter 
offer and no compelling reason to reject joint physical and legal 
custody. Oksana did not play the child abuse card until custody 
evaluation. 
3. Now seeking primary custody under the heightened scrutiny standard in 
which Appellant has presented evidence that Appellee has willfully, 
knowingly, and maliciously conspired to falsely allege abuse and in 
other ways falsely and illegally demonize and discredit the Appellant 
with the intent to deprive him of his parental rights. Abundant case law 
presented herein and at trial, show that false allegations constitute 
abuse and unfitness and that it is not in the best interests of children to 
remain with such parents. Under Utah statute, if child abuse is found, it 
is reason to award primary custody to the other parent. Thus, Appellee 
intended to sabotage the possibility of a cooperative parental 
relationship, setting up a situation where it was nearly impossible for the 
parents to have a cooperative parenting arrangement. In constrast, 
Appellant wanted to avoid this. (Adden. 7 & 8). It is a well known tactic 
by unethical primary caretakers to intentionally sabotage the 
relationship knowing that in a "he said/she said" stalemate, the Courts 
will always default to the primary caretaker. However, in the instant 
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case, the Appellant provided abundant evidence that broke through the 
stalemate, clearly showing the malignant motives of the Appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant asserts that his position from the outset has been one of 
cooperative parenting and that the only reason for now claiming primary 
custody is that it is clearly in the best interests of the child to not be in the 
primary custody of a mother, mother's spouse, grandmother and a sibling 
who are intentionally uncooperative without good cause, who seek to 
sabotage the relationship, alienate the child from the father and who model 
untruthful behavior. 
For the trial Court to reinforce such repulsive behavior with an award of 
sole physical and legal custody reinforces future bad behavior and sets a 
precedent for other parents to emulate that behavior. 
WHEREFORE, the Appellant prays that the entire judgment be reversed and that 
if remand is necessary, that it be remanded to another Judge for a fair and 
impartial trial on the merits. 
s 0 ^ / day of Dated t h i 0 /  f March, 2007 
Loren E. Pearce, Appellant 
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